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II. FACTS AND HISTORY OF TURKETTE
The issue in Turkette was whether a group whose members engaged solely in criminal activity constituted an "enterprise" within the scope of RICO section 1962.16 The indictment alleged that Turkette was the central figure in an "enterprise," which the indictment described as: a group of individuals associated in fact for the purpose of illegally trafficking in narcotics and other dangerous drugs, committing arsons, utilizing the United States mails to defraud insurance companies, bribing and attempting to bribe local police officers, and corruptly influencing and attempting to corruptly influence the outcome of state court proceedings ....
17
The indictment charged Turkette and his twelve associates with conspiring to conduct or participate in the affairs of an "enterprise" affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. 18 The activities of the "enterprise"' 9 constituted a "pattern of racketeering activity" since they included at least two state and federal crimes listed in RICO section 1961.20 Turkette was convicted by a jury, sentenced to a (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), § § 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, § 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or § 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), or (D) any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States .. " 15 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) : "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. .. . 16 101 S. Ct. at 2526. 17 Indictment at 15. (The indictment is contained in the Joint Appendix following the Brief for the Petitioner). The RICO conspiracy count was the last count of a nine-count indictment and charged Turkette and his twelve associates. Id at 14-15. Seven of the defendants pleaded guilty before trial. Of the six remaining defendants, the district court convicted only Turkette on the RICO count. Although the district court dismissed the RICO count against defendant Vargas, it refused his motion for severance, and he was convicted on one of the other counts. The appeal to the First Circuit involved both Turkette and Vargas. United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 896.
18 The participation in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity violated 18 U.S.C . § 1962(c) . The defendants were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) which makes it unlawful to conspire to violate 18 U.S.C . § 1962(c) . See note 7supra.
19 The activities included in the indictment are listed in the text accompanying note 17 .uprna. 20 Indictment at 15-16. The indictment charged the defendants with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (relating to the unlawful distribution of controlled substances), and several sections of the Massachusetts General Laws. Id twenty-year term and fined $20,000 for the RICO count.
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On appeal, Turkette argued that because the sole purpose of RICO was to protect legitimate enterprises from infiltration by organized crime, 22 RICO did not extend to the illegal activities of Turkette and his associates. 23 After examining the language and structure of RICO and the statute's legislative history, 24 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit concluded that RICO limited "enterprise" to legitimate organizations. 2 5 Since Turkette and his associates were not connected with any legitimate "enterprise," the First Circuit held that RICO was inapplicable. 2 6 The court of appeals reversed Turkette's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. This narrow interpretation of "enterprise" by the First Circuit was contrary to the position adopted by every other circuit which had addressed the issue. 28 The Supreme Court granted certiorari 29 in order to resolve the conflict over the scope of the term "enterprise" in RICO. 3 0
The Court examined the language of the statute and concluded, contrary to the findings of the First Circuit, that "neither the language nor structure of RICO limits its application to legitimate 'enterprises.' "31 The Court also examined the legislative history of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 as a whole and Title IX in 21 101 S. Ct. at 2527. The jury also found Turkette guilty on the other eight counts contained in the indictment. Id Turkette's sentence on the RICO conviction was to run concurrently with his twenty-year sentence for the other counts. The Supreme Court's decision in Trkette confirmed the majority view, adopted by eight circuits, 36 that the term "enterprise" in RICO encompassed illegitimate enterprises. In four of these circuits, however, there had been strong dissents arguing that "enterprise" should be interpreted narrowly so as to exclude illegitimate organizations.
3 7 The Sixth Circuit had only recently adopted the broad interpretation when it reversed en banc a decision by a three-judge panel. 38 Commentators were fairly evenly divided over the issue. 39 The position of the Eighth Circuit 260, 270 (6th Cir. 1979) , that "enterprise" must be confined to individuals "organized and acting for some ostensibly lawful purpose, either formally declared or informally recognized." Id The Sixth Circuit, en banc, rejected the narrow interpretation: "the statute itself makes it plain that Congress intended to bring the full force of federal law enforcement into the effort to destroy organized crime and that it had no intention of limiting the federal effort to just those 'ostensibly legitimate' enterprises which organized crime might use." 642 F.2d at 1003. Since the Sixth Circuit found no ambiguity in the statute, it concluded that the statute must be interpreted by courts as written. One objection to the broad interpretation of "enterprise" in RICO has been that if wholly illegitimate organizations qualified as "enterprises," the "enterprise" element would be eliminated from the statute. Proof of two acts of racketeering would establish both the "pattern" and the existence of an "enterprise," making RICO merely a proscription against "patterns of racketeering activity.1 42 The First Circuit offered this argument in support of its narrow interpretation of "enterprise" in Turkette. 43 This objection to the inclusion of illegitimate enterprises within the scope of RICO confuses the elements necessary to establish a RICO violation. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Trkette, to secure a conviction under RICO, the government must establish both the existence of an "enterprise" and a "pattern of racketeering activity" con- Itself', 55 NOTRE DAME LAw. 777 (1980 1981) , a panel of the Eighth Circuit held that "enterprise" encompasses "only an association having an ascertainable structure which exists for the purpose of maintaining operations directed toward an economic goal that has an existence that can be defined apart from the commission of the predicate acts constituting the 'pattern of racketeering activity."' Id at 1372. The court distinguished its holding from the panel decision in United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d 290, by pointing out that its decision did not rest "on the word 'legitimate' but rather on the need for a discrete economic association existing separately from the racketeering activity." 626 F.2d at 1372. The definition of "enterprise" in Anderson appears to encompass wholly illegitimate enterprises if they meet the requirements quoted above. See, e.g The confusion over the need to establish the existence of an "enterprise" separate from the occurrence of the acts which constitute the "pattern of racketeering activity" stems in part from the failure of courts to indicate clearly which entity is the "enterprise" significant for the RICO prosecution. 46 The decision in Turkette should eliminate some of the confusion over the proof necessary to establish an "enterprise" and the type of "enterprise" relevant to a RICO charge. The Court stated that the existence of an "enterprise" is "proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. '4 7 This description restricts the definition in RICO section 1961(4) and represents a departure from the vague standards previously applied by lower courts.
48
The Supreme Court's restriction of the term "enterprise" answers 44 101 S. Ct. at 2529. The prosecution had not disputed this point. Id at 2529 n.5. 45 Id at 2528-29. 46 For example, in United States v. Aleman, 609 F.2d 298, the court did not discuss what evidence established that the defendants constituted an "enterprise." In the statement of findings, however, the court did note facts that indicated that the defendants were "associated in fact" and had participated in the three criminal acts together. Id at 301-02. Thus, the court may merely have failed to state that since the defendants were "associated in fact," they were an "enterprise" as required by RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). The court, however, may have been confused as to which entity was the "enterprise." See 609 F.2d at 305. There seems to have been early confusion over how the broad definition of "enterprise" related to the RICO concern with infiltration of legitimate business. See id; United States v. Sutton, 642 F.2d at 1005 Sutton, 642 F.2d at , 1010 Sutton, 642 F.2d at -11, 1015 47 This description of the evidence necessary to prove the existence of an "enterprise" does not appear to be limited to the case before the Court. Since the Court had, however, qualified a preceding statement concerning the definition of "enterprise," one could argue that the subsequent statement, quoted in the text, was also limited to Turkelie. The complete passage reads:
In order to secure a conviction under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an "enterprise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." The enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) . The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise. 101 S. Ct. at 2528. 48 See note 46 supra. In United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 898, the court described an "association in fact" enterprise as "an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret criminal network." Id But the court also used language very similar to that found in the Supreme Court's description in Turketle: "[i]n defining 'enterprise,' Congress made clear that the statute extended beyond conventional business organizations to reach 'any. . .group of individuals' whose association, however loose or informal, furnishes a vehicle for the commission of two or more predicate crimes." Id See, e.g., United States v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2528. critics who claimed that the inclusion of wholly illegitimate organizations would permit prosecutorial abuse in the application of RICO.
49
The First Circuit expressed concern in its Turkette decision that RICO would be used against individuals who had merely committed two gambling or prostitution offenses within ten years. 50 Such violations would be acts of "racketeering activity" sufficient for RICO prosecution if they were prohibited by state law. 5 1 RICO was designed for use against more than just isolated criminal acts. 5 2 The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on RICO explained that "[t]he target of title IX is . . .not sporadic activity. The infiltration of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern.1 5 3 In Turkette, the Supreme Court limited the application of RICO to "ongoing organizations" whose "various associates function as a continuing unit." 5 4 This definition of "enterprise" reduces the potential for abuse in the application of RICO by requiring continuity in the "enterprise" element. 55 This approach allows RICO to be used against individuals who engage in organized criminal activity. If the Court had required continuity in the "pattern" element as some courts and commentators have suggested, 56 49 United States v. Turkette, 632 F.2d at 902, 903-04; United States v. Sutton, 605 F.2d at 266; Comment, 27 DEPAUL L. REv., supra note 38, at 100-01; Comment, 50 U. CIN. L. RE,., supra note 40, at 132; Note, 11 U. TOL. L. REv., supra note 39, at 704; Note, 33 VAND. L. REV., supra note 39, at 446-47. Although this objection was related to the misconception that the "enterprise" element would be eliminated if the broad interpretation were accepted, these critics would have probably made the same objection if the "enterprise" element, although established separately from the "pattern of racketeering activity," could have consisted merely of individuals "associated in fact" for conducting criminal activity. L. REV., supra note 39, at 477. In United States v. Stofsky, 409 F. Supp. at 614, the court viewed the "pattern" element in RICO "as including a requirement that the racketeering acts must have been connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not simply a series of disconnected acts." Id. The language of the Senate Report quoted in the text accompanying note 53 supra does offer some grounds for such a conclusion. In United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 899 n.23, the court rejected the suggestions of the district courts in United States v. Stofsky and United States v. White, recognizing that RICO "does require a type of relatedness: the two or more predicate crimes must be related to the affairs of the enterprise but need not otherwise be related to each other." I4 This is the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Turkelle. See note 47 & accompanying text supra.
RICO would have been unnecessarily limited to those criminal enterprises that confine their activities to related types of crimes. As the. Fifth Circuit noted in United States z. Elliott, 5 7 although RICO is not aimed at sporadic activity, there is no reason that it should not be applied to enterprises involved in diversified criminal activity. 5 8
The limitation of "enterprise" to organizations that have engaged in ongoing criminal activity does not prevent the application of RICO to persons other than members of organized crime groups such as the Mafia. Although members of such groups had been the original target of the Organized Crime Control Act, Congress decided upon a broader attack.
5 9 "Organized crime" is used in RICO in its generic sense, referring to any organized criminal activity. 60 Since Congress was aware that RICO would also reach individuals not associated with organized crime groups such as the Mafia, 6 1 criticism of RICO prosecutions of small, informally organized groups which have committed only a few criminal acts is not justified if the acts and the organization of such groups meet the RICO requirements. 62 The use of RICO against such groups is not prosecutorial abuse.
Opponents of the broad interpretation of "enterprise" have also argued that since adequate remedies already exist for persons who participate in wholly criminal organizations, it is not necessary to extend the application of RICO to such organizations. 63 In Turkette, the First Circuit noted that Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act covered 57 571 F.2d at 899. LAW. 55, 61 (1970) . The drafters of RICO realized that it would be impossible to limit the statute to organized crime groups like the Mafia, and even if such a restriction could be drafted, it would encounter constitutional problems. 116 CONG. REC. 18940, 35343-44 (1970 one type of criminal enterprise-the illegal gambling business.4 Title VIII makes it unlawful to "condtict, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part" of a gambling business involving five or more persons. 65 The court of appeals reasoned that Congress could not have intended that Title IX would apply to illegitimate enterprises such as illegal gambling businesses, for this would permit circumvention of the Title VIII fiveperson requirement. 6 6 The Supreme Court did not address this issue in Turkette. The First Circuit, however, misinterpreted the RICO requirements. Participation in a gambling business prohibited by Title VIII does qualify as "racketeering activity" under RICO section 1961(1)(B).67 Gambling activity in violation of Title VIII is, however, subject to RICO prosecution only if the gambling "enterprise" is indictable under Title VIII.68 Operation of a gambling business could serve as one of the predicate acts required for RICO only if the requirements of Title VIII were met. 69 RICO does not circumvent the provisions of other federal statutes such as Title VIII. RICO prohibits, instead, the separate offense of engaging in a pattern of gambling or other "racketeering activity." 70 Although RICO section 1961 (1) (A) allows for prosecution of state gambling law violations and these laws may not require five persons, this use of RICO would have no effect on the applicability of Title VIII. The provisions of Title VIII have no import for the issue of whether illegitimate organizations are within the scope of Title IX.
Congress enacted RICO and the other provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 because existing remedies were inadequate.
71
The Supreme Court was aware that RICO represented a new approach to combating organized criminal activity when it rejected the First Circuit's narrow interpretation of "enterprise. The definition of "enterprise" in section 1961(4) reads: " 'enterprise' includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity. ' 76 The Supreme Court recognized in Turkette that the language of section 1961(4) clearly permits both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises. 77 The definition of "enterprise" contains no restriction on the purpose of the organization. As the Court noted, Congress could have easily limited the application of "enterprise" by inserting "legitimate" into the definition, 78 but neither the word "legitimate" nor "illegitimate," nor terms with similar meanings, appears in any of the sections of RICO.
All courts which have considered the scope of RICO's "enterprise" requirement have examined the statute's legislative history. 79 There is no dispute that the primary purpose of Title IX was to combat the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime. 8 76 The definitions in 18 U.S.C. § 1961 differ in whether they are introduced with the term "means" or "includes." Those definitions which begin with "includes" appear to be merely illustrative and not exhaustive lists.
77 101 S. Ct. at 2527. "On its face, the definition appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises within its scope; it no more excludes criminal enterprises than it does legitimate ones." Id 78 Id at 2527. One could counter with the argument that since Congress intended for the statute to reach only legitimate businesses, there was no need to qualify "enterprise." See note 103 infra. Although the concern with legitimate enterprises is obvious in the legislative history, see note 80 infra, this purpose is not clear in the language of the statute. pressed clearly in the reports of the hearings and debates on RICO and the other provisions of the Organized Crime Control Act. 81 Language in an earlier Supreme Court opinion had also indicated that the primary aim of Title IX was to protect legitimate enterprises. 82 The real dispute over the significance of the legislative history of RICO is whether the prevention of further infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime was the sole objective of Title IX, or merely one of the statute's purposes.
83
The First Circuit concluded in Turkette that because the definition of "enterprise" did not indicate whether it included illegitimate organizations, the language of the definition was ambiguous. 84 The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the majority of the courts of appeals that the language of Section 1961(4) was clear and broad, 8 5 and the Court held that wholly illegitimate enterprises were included within "enterprise" in RICO. 8 6 If one reads the definition of "enterprise" together with the legislative history of RICO, it is possible to conclude that the language of section 1961(4) is unclear, since "enterprise" is not confined to the "legitimate enterprises" which were clearly Congress' primary concern in enacting RICO. The First Circuit committed a logical error, however, when it concluded from the legislative history that "enterprise" must be limited to legitimate businesses. 87 The Supreme Court recognized correctly in Turkette that, although it was clear from the legislative history that RICO was aimed at preventing the infiltration of legitimate businesses, it did not necessarily follow that this was the statute's sole purpose. 88 There was evidence that Congress was concerned with more than just the protection of legitimate businesses. 89 The statement of findings prefacing the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 stated:
The Congress finds [that] . ..(2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation. . . and (5) organized crime continues to grow. . . because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact. 90 The findings further stated that it was the purpose of Congress in enacting the Organized Crime Control Act "to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime." 9 1 In Turkette, the Supreme Court recognized that if the term "enterprise" in RICO were limited to legitimate enterprises, a number of the targets mentioned in section (2) of the statement of findings (quoted above) would not be within the reach of the Act.
92 "[L]oan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs" 93 would be "immune from prosecution under RICO so long as the association did not deviate from the criminal path. ' 94 Since no other title of the Act addresses these activities, crimes which Congress had indicated it wanted to reach would not be within the scope of the Act.
95
Additional support for the inclusion of illegitimate associations within the meaning of "enterprise" in RICO is found in the fact that it would be impossible to apply a legitimate-illegitimate distinction without absurd results. § 1961 (1981 pocket part) .
98 These persons could be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § § 1962(c) The Supreme Court's decision in Turkette represents the best approach to the interpretation of RICO. The broad reading of "enterprise" to include wholly illegitimate associations within the purview of RICO's prohibitions permits the statute to serve as an effective tool in combating organized criminal activity. The broad language of Title IX, the overall purpose of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, and the Senate Judiciary Committee's recent expressions of approval support the Supreme Court's holding.
V.
INTERPRETING RICO: THE APPLICABILITY OF

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
meaning of "enterprise" plain, however, it had other grounds for objecting to the First Circuit's application *of construction aids.
The rule of Siusdem generi has been used frequently by courts interpreting "enterprise" in RICO."' This rule provides that where general words follow an enumeration of specific items, the general words are read as being limited to items similar to those specifically enumerated. 11 2 The First Circuit applied this rule in Trkette and concluded that since each of the enterprises specifically enumerated in the first part of the definition of "enterprise" was a legitimate organization, the phrase "any. . . group of individuals associated in fact" in the second part of the definition must also be limited to legitimate enterprises. 1 13 A number of judges and commentators had applied the rule with similar results. 114 The Supreme Court recognized that the First Circuit had erred in its application of the rule. 1 15 The specifically enumerated enterprises in the first half of the definition-individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or other legal entities-could be either legitimate or illegitimate entities.' 16 The two parts of section 1961(4) describe two different types of enterprises: those which are recognized as legal entities and those which are not."
17 Ejusdem generis was not applicable to the definition of "enterprise" in RICO section 1961(4).
The First Circuit also applied the principle of lenity in Turkette as an aid in determining the proper scope of "enterprise." ' 1 8 This "ancient" rule of statutory construction provides that if there is ambiguity in a penal statute, the statute should be strictly construed against the prosecuting party and in favor of the defendant. 119 Unlike most penal statutes, however, Title IX contains a "liberal construction" clause which says that provisions included in the title "shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purpose."' 2 0 The Supreme Court agreed with the majority of the courts of appeal that RICO's liberal Opponents of the broad interpretation of "enterprise" have been concerned that the inclusion of wholly criminal associations in RICO would allow for prosecutorial abuse in the application of the statute.
2
Although the Supreme Court restricted "enterprise" in Turkette to ongoing organizations,123 additional limitations may be needed to prevent abuse.
There has been concern that RICO could be used to prosecute persons only remotely associated with a criminal enterprise.1 24 Some commentators have suggested that since the RICO penalties are so severe, a scienter requirement should be included in RICO to prevent unjust application of the statute. 25 A scienter requirement would make it necessary to establish that a person prosecuted as a member of an "association-in-fact" enterprise was aware that he was participating in an organization which was engaging in racketeering activities. 126 If an explicit scienter standard is needed, it should not be too stringent. One commentator has proposed a requirement that all members in a criminal enterprise know each other and be aware of all the types of racketeering activity in which the members engaged.' 27 This requirement would thwart RICO's goal of reaching more than just the central figures in large criminal organizations. 128 Recent prosecutions under RICO indicate that an explicit scienter requirement may not be needed, however. In cases involving large numbers of defendants, RICO prosecutions have succeeded only against the principal participants. 129 In Turkette, only the leader of the thirteen-member criminal enterprise was convicted on the RICO count. 30 The criminal enterprise in United
